People have a tendency to marry within their social group or to marry a person who is close to them in status. Although many characteristics play a role in the choice of a spouse, sociologists have most often examined endogamy and homogamy with respect to race/ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status. I first give an overview of hypotheses on the causes of endogamy and homogamy. The various hypotheses that have been suggested in the literature can be distinguished as arguments about three more general factors: (a) the preferences of marriage candidates for certain characteristics in a spouse, (b) the interference of"third parties" in the selection process, and (c) the constraints of the marriage market in which candidates are searching for a spouse. Second, I summarize empirical research by answering four ques- coincide? Third, I discuss strengths and weaknesses of past research. Strengths include the mass of descriptive work that has been done and the development of a multifaceted theoretical perspective which gives sociological theorizing an edge over psychological and economic theories of partner choice. Weaknesses include the lack of standardization of methods in describing patterns and trends and the relatively weak integration of empirical and theoretical work.
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of this century, sociologists have described patter ner choice and have tried to explain why people marry within their dogamy) and why people marry persons close in status (homogam search literature can be divided into three traditions, depending on w of characteristic is considered. Research on ethnic and racial inter originated in immigrant countries such as the United States and is by the question of whether the various nationality groups would int one another and with the original population (Drachsler 1920; Wir hamer 1944) . Research on religious intermarriage has been done bo outside the United States and has been concerned with the extent to which churches control the life choices of their members and the degree to which religious involvement translates into the membership of "communal groups" (Kennedy 1944) . Research on socioeconomic homogamy was developed by stratification researchers who used marriage patterns in conjunction with mobility patterns to describe how open stratification systems are (Glass 1954) .
Although the underlying issues are diverse, one common theme is that all traditions characterize social differentiation by describing patterns of social interaction. Building on the Weberian notion of status group closure, students have argued that interaction between social groups provides a fundamental way to describe the group boundaries that make up the social structure. Because marriage is an intimate and often long-term relationship, intermarriage or heterogamy not only reveals the existence of interaction across group boundaries, it also shows that members of different groups accept each other as social equals. Intermarriage can thus be regarded as an intimate link between social groups; conversely, endogamy or homogamy can be regarded as a form of group closure.
Another common theme lies in the consequences of intermarriage. First, intermarriage decreases the salience of cultural distinctions in future generations because the children of mixed marriages are less likely to identify themselves with a single group. Although mixed couples may socialize their children into the culture of a single group, these children are less likely to identify with that group when intermarriage in society is common. Second, by intermarrying, individuals may lose the negative attitudes they have toward other groups. Although personal interaction between groups sometimes fosters conflicts by making economic and cultural differences more apparent, if the relationship is intimate, interaction gives people an opportunity to realize the individual variety among the members of another group and, in doing so, may ultimately weaken their prejudices and stereotypes. Because intermarriage often connects the social networks of the two spouses, this applies to a range ofoutgroup members and not just to the immediate partners.
In short, what makes intermarriage sociologically relevant lies in ent dynamic: It is not just a reflection of the boundaries that currentl groups in society, it also bears the potential of cultural and socioe change. While marriage patterns are in this sense telling social indic do not tell us everything. First, if members of two groups do not mar other, it does not necessarily mean that both groups are closed. It ta marry, and if one group is closed while the other is open, endogam prevail. Research on marriage is less informative in this respect tha stance, research on individual racial prejudice. In a similar vein, ho tells a somewhat ambiguous story about the preferences and preju status groups. Homogamy will occur if people prefer to marry into h groups, but it will also occur when people prefer to marry statushigh-status groups, preferences for high-status spouses and prefe status-equals are similar, but in lower-status groups, these are differ Second, marriage patterns result from both preference and opport portunity to marry within the group depends on many factors, such a tial segregation, the composition of local marriage markets, group s on. As a result, endogamy does not necessarily point to a personally distance toward a certain outgroup. Such preferences play a role, bu extent they determine the actual choices people make is an empirica Marriage patterns simply tell us which groups interact with whom, this is an important piece of information, they do not tell us why.
A third and final limitation of marriage patterns lies in demographi Declining marriage rates, the rise of cohabitation, and the increase suggest that it is not always valid to treat marriage patterns as indicat ferentiation in society as a whole. Some of these problems can be so easily than others. The rise of cohabitation poses no real problem be can often include cohabiting couples in the analysis. Declining marr are also less of a problem because they are largely the result of mar lays; the vast majority of a given birth cohort eventually marries.
divorce is more problematic, because intermarriage and divorce are o tively related. A high rate of ethnic intermarriage may point to o groups, but if mixed marriages are more likely to break up, such a would need further study.
In the past decades, researchers have described patterns of interm examined individual variations in intermarriage, and assessed chan termarriage over time. In addition, both theoretical and empirical s developed hypotheses about why people marry within their group some do while others do not. Because such hypotheses are often not rectly, I divide my review into a theoretical and an empirical sectio of the theoretical section is to review micro-and macro-level hypoth the causes of intermarriage and homogamy and to put these into a ge retical framework. The goal of the empirical section is to summarize variations, and trends in intermarriage. I focus on the three main so group characteristics (i.e. race and ethnicity, religion, and socioe status), I limit myself to Western societies, and I discuss studies cond the last decade.
THEORETICAL WORK ON INTERMARRIAGE AND HOMOGAMY
Marriage patterns arise from the interplay between three social f preferences of individuals for certain characteristics in a spouse, the of the social group of which they are members, and the constraints of riage market in which they are searching for a spouse (Kalmijn 19 though these factors represent analytically distinct hypotheses, they often been regarded as complementary elements of a single theory, what distinguishes the sociological perspective from economic or ps cal theories on partner choice (e.g. Winch 1958 ).
Preferences of Marriage Candidates
To understand aggregate patterns of marriage selection, researche concept of a marriage market. Unmarried men and women operate marriage market where each individual considers a set of potentia Potential spouses are evaluated on the basis of the resources they hav and individuals compete with each other for the spouse they want m fering their own resources in return. Several kinds of resources obv a role in the choice of a spouse, but sociologists have mostly focused economic and cultural resources. When married, spouses pool these to produce family goods, such as economic well-being, status, socia mation, and affection. SOCIOECONOMIC RESOURCES Socioeconomic resources are defined as resources that produce economic well-being and status. Economic well-being is shared by the family members and status is granted to the family as a unit rather than to its individual members. As a result, the income and status of one spouse contribute to the income and status of the other by raising the income and status of the family. People maximize their income and status by searching for a spouse with attractive socioeconomic resources. The outcome of this competition is that the most attractive candidates select among themselves while the least attractive candidates have to rely on one another. Competition for socioeconomic resources on the marriage market thus leads to an aggregate pattern of homogamy.
The nature of this competition varies with the role women play in society.
When marriage is based on the benefits that stem from the division of paid and domestic labor in the household, prevailing gender differences in
give men a comparative advantage in productive labor so that the wi used more productively when it is spent on household labor. As a re and women exchange paid and domestic labor resources. Similar ar have been made with regard to status and prestige. When the status o ily depends primarily on the occupation of the husband, there will change of male prestige and female qualities in other respects, suc background, physical attractiveness, and cultural participation (Jaco stenberg 1986; Stevens et al 1990; Uunk 1996) . Both types of exchange suggest that men, unlike women, do no among themselves for female socioeconomic resources in the marr ket. There are good reasons to believe that this has changed. An in number of married women participate in the labor market and women's work is now less often motivated by temporary economi the family. Several authors believe that these changes have made wo cioeconomic resources increasingly attractive to men. The wife's hum tal may facilitate the husband's access to networks that are helpful reer, her earnings may subsidize his human capital investments, and nomic security she provides may lessen his need to settle for short-t benefits, thus increasing his opportunity to choose more attractive, career objectives. Because female labor is now often the reflection o desire to work outside the home, rather than a reflection of the econo of the family, the wife's socioeconomic resources may also become ingly important for the status of the family (Davis 1984) .
CULTURAL RESOURCES While the importance of socioeconomic re based on a preference to marry a resourceful spouse, independent of resources, the role of cultural resources is based on a preference t someone who is similar. Preferences for cultural similarity have b dressed most extensively in the social psychological literature on pe traction (Byrne 1971) . Similarity of values and opinions leads to m firmation of each other's behavior and worldviews, similarity of tast tive because it enlarges opportunities to participate in joint activities larity of knowledge creates a common basis for conversation, which mutual understanding.
Although originally developed to explain attraction between stra day-to-day interaction, these notions have also been applied to ma Maggio & Mohr 1985; Kalmijn 1994) . Because cultural similarity lea sonal attraction, it is a prerequisite for getting involved with someo of its instrumental effects, cultural similarity also encourages peop lish a long-term relationship. Since many activities in marriage are as the raising of children, the purchase of a house and other consume and the spending of leisure time, dissimilarity in taste would complica shared activities. More generally, people prefer to marry someone w similar cultural resources because this enables them to develop a comm style in marriage that produces social confirmation and affection.
PREFERENCES AND HOMOGAMY Preferences for socioeconomic and cultural resources do not by themselves translate into homogamy and endogamy with respect to social characteristics. Some authors argue that social characteristics are correlated with such resources, and that homogamy or endogamy is the unintended by-product of individual preferences for resources in a partner. This argument has often been made for educational homogamy, because education is not only strongly related to income and status, but also to taste, values, and lifestyles (Kalmijn 1991a) . Similar arguments can be made for horizontally differentiated groups, such as ethnic groups, although in this case, endogamy is probably more the result of preferences for cultural similarity and not so much the result of competition for economically attractive spouses.
Other authors argue that social characteristics are more than simply correlates of the resources partners bring to the marriage market. Characteristics such as education, occupation, race, and ethnicity are also seen as badges that individuals wear to show others what kind of person they are. In this perspective, spouse selection is regarded as a filter process. In the first step, people develop a network of friends, acquaintances, and possibly marriage candidates with whom they share some objective social characteristic. In the second step, people find their spouse by interacting within these homogeneous networks. The second step is also the phase in which psychological characteristics come into play, but at that time, homogamy with respect to objective social characteristics is already insured (Murstein 1976 ).
Third Parties
A second hypothesis about why people marry within their group focuses on people who are not directly involved in the marriage. Because mixed marriages may threaten the internal cohesion and homogeneity of the group, "third parties" have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying exogamously. There are two ways in which third parties prevent exogamy: by group identification and by group sanctions.
GROUP IDENTIFICATION Children are typically brought up with a sense of group identification. Identification either takes the form of an awareness of a common social history, what is sometimes called a "sense of peoplehood" (Gordon 1964) , or it can take the form of a more psychological sense of being different from others. The stronger such feelings of group identification, the more people have internalized norms of endogamy, and the more likely it is that they marry homogamously or endogamously. The notion of group identi-fication has been especially important for racial and ethnic groups norms of endogamy are believed to be firmly internalized (Merton 1 norms, however, may also apply to other kinds of groups such as so and educational groups.
How strongly younger generations identify themselves with the pends to a great extent on the homogeneity of the networks in which th bedded. When adolescents live in neighborhoods that are homogene respect to the social and cultural characteristics of their parents, the likely to develop a sense of belonging to that group. While residentia tion in urban areas hampers opportunities to intermarry directly, cussed later, it also reduced exogamy by intensifying feelings of gro ity. Identification with the origin group is believed to be weakened education. Owing to the emphasis on individual achievement and un tic principles in higher education, the college-educated may be less identify themselves with their social and cultural roots (Hwang et The strongest sanctions against intermarriage have been provided by the state. Laws on racial intermarriage in the United States-abolished in 1967-are a well-known example (Davis 1991) . When slavery was a the gradual decline in formal inequality of blacks and whites went hand with a growing anxiety about the social boundary between the r this anxiety was stronger when contacts were more intimate. Interra and marriage were condemned with great vigor, and strong soc emerged against interracial contacts with possible sexual undertone interracial dancing and swimming. The emerging doctrine of no soci ity was formalized in legislation that segregated the races in public (Jim Crow laws) and legislation that controlled their sexual and ma tacts (antimiscegenation laws).
Marriage Markets
Endogamy and homogamy are not only governed by individual-an level factors, but also by structural arrangements. The chances to m dogamously are higher the more often one meets people within the the more often one interacts with group members on a day-to-day b tact opportunities are shaped by several structural arrangements. Som focus on the demographic composition of the population as a whole studies examine regional distributions of groups, and yet other studi smaller, functional settings, such as the school and the workplace.
THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS When interaction occurs randomly, the cha woman in a certain group marries someone in her own group equals portion of men who are in that group. As a result, members of a sm will have lower chances of marrying endogamously than members of group. The effect of group size implies that endogamy is negatively r the degree of heterogeneity of a population (Blau & Schwartz 1984) plain this, one can think of two populations, each consisting of tw One population is heterogeneous and has 50% in each group (e.g. 100 A, 100 in group B), while the other is homogeneous and has 90% in o and 10% in the other (e.g. 180 in group A, 20 in group B). Both pop have equal numbers of males and females in each group. In the heter population, the number of women expected to marry within the grou 0.5 x 50 = 25 for A and 0.5 x 50 = 25 for B, which boils down to 50%
within the group. In the homogeneous population, the number of wo pected to marry within the group will be 0.9 x 90 = 81 for A and 0.1 x B, which boils down to 82%. This shows that in a heterogeneous po endogamy is lower than in a homogeneous population, provided that is random.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF GROUPS The chance to encounter a member of one's own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is (Blau & Schwartz 1984) . Groups that are c trated in specific regions of the country generally have more opportun marry endogamously than groups that are not (Lieberson & Waters 198 amples are common in the literature on ethnic groups, e.g. Asian-Ameri California, Jewish-Americans in New York City, or Catholics and Prote separated in the southern and northern parts of the Netherlands. An ad reason why it is important to consider the geography of groups is that i may be correlated with group size. Smaller groups are often more iso Jewish-Americans, for example, may have partly overcome the constr their small group size through geographic concentration. They are a s group in a large country, but a large group in a small region. Although relaxing the assumption of an even geographic distributi more realistic, it also leads to new problems. If one controls for geog segregation-by calculating endogamy rates for specific regions, f stance-one implicitly assumes that people base their decision to li given area on factors that are independent of ingroup preferences. Thi always realistic. For instance, there is much regional concentration of Americans in the United States, but even though this can in part be attrib their particular immigration history and occupational opportunities, the p ences of Italian-Americans play a role as well (Lieberson 1980) . While it ficult to make a precise distinction between preferences and constraint generally true that the smaller the marriage market one studies, the m structure of the market is affected by preferences and the less by const LOCAL MARRIAGE MARKETS Unmarried people do not just wander ar region looking for a spouse; they spend most of their life in small and tional places, such as neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, bars, and Such "local marriage markets" are often socially segregated, and that they are important for explaining marriage patterns. In the sociological ture, three local markets have been considered most frequently: the sch neighborhood, and the workplace. Of these three, schools are consider most efficient markets because they are homogeneous with respect to heterogeneous with respect to sex. Workplaces are considered less eff but increased participation of women in the labor market and declining pational sex segregation suggest that this may have changed (Davis 19 though it has not often been studied where couples meet, a French study that the settings sociologists analyze are not the most common meeting Among young French couples, fewer than 5% met in the neighborhood than 10% met at school, and just over 10% met at work (Bozon & Heran To clarify how local marriage markets affect homogamy, authors h looked at the composition of these markets with respect to social chara tics. What distinguishes the neighborhood from the school and the wor is that it is homogeneous with respect to factors such as ethnicity, r gion, and family background, i.e. characteristics transmitted by pare berson 1980). Schools are less homogeneous in ascribed characteri though there are exceptions, e.g. Catholic colleges and black colleges same time, schools are not necessarily homogeneous with respect to tional attainment. Differences in ultimate educational attainment are l high schools, for example, than in universities, simply because the ed system works like a funnel, particularly in the United States (Mare general, however, it is expected that colleges promote educational hom more than neighborhoods do, while neighborhoods promote ethnic en and homogamy of family background more than schools. Whether wo encourage homogamy highly depends on the type of work, but on a they probably do not encourage socioeconomic homogamy as much as s 
Measures and Models
Intermarriage can be calculated for the stock of marriages at a given point time (prevalence measures) or for people who marry in a given period of ti (incidence measures). Incidence measures are generally preferable, in particu lar if one analyzes trends. If the stock of marriages is used, one can analy characteristics at the time of survey or characteristics at the time of marria The latter measures are more suitable than the former because some characteristics change after marriage. Because partners may become more alike during marriage-they may switch faith, for example, or influence each other's occupational career-current measures of homogamy tend to be biased upwardly. To describe intermarriage, various measures have been used. To explain these, it is helpful to consider the following marriage and Cxx are marriages that do not inv ratio can be defined as (CAA/CAX)/( tant advantages. First, they provide a one indicate that there is more endoga the ratio, the greater the degree of end comparing endogamy across groups b tive sizes of the groups in the marria A disadvantage of the measures disc the married or marrying population. A account that not everyone marries is on so-called harmonic mean models d refer to the total number of males an ried and unmarried), Z is defined as FPB)/(MA/MPA+MB/MPB+FA/FPA+F from zero for minimum intermarria When selection is random, the index Percentages, odds ratios, and the int ordered and nonordered characterist common measure is the Pearsonian positive correlation means that high-than low-status men; it does not necessarily mean that people marry w their group. The correlation between the ages of husband and wife, for ple, is strongly positive, even though most men marry somewhat youn women.
MODELS Second to measures of intermarriage, loglinear m used to describe patterns of marriage selection. These mode expected counts in the marriage table are a multiplicative f size, the number of males in a group, the number of female interaction parameter, which measures marriage selection i marginal row and column distributions. Many ways to mo parameter exist, but most authors present parameters for the within the group (endogamy) and parameters for the tende marrying when controlling for the tendency to marry within marriage). The latter parameters are often equivalent to od been described by the metaphors of distances or boundari (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991b) . When characteristics are o models also provide single measures of association that are relations but independent of the marginal distributions, i.e tion models (Hout 1982) . When characteristics are not ord of loglinear models exist that provide measures of the groups as revealed by the marriage frequencies in the table tive models (Johnson 1980; Kalmijn 1993a ).
Patterns of Intermarriage and Homogamy
In describing patterns of intermarriage and homogamy, re There are also differences among European subgroups-for instance, endogamy is lower for "old" than for "new" European groups-but these are small when considering the range in the list. The main conclusion of Lieberson and Water's analysis is that groups who are more recent to the host society have higher degrees of closure, a regularity that fits well into assimilation theories. Blacks are the prime exception to this pattern. A similar relationship between the newness of a group and its level of endogamy is found in Australia (Jones & Luijkx 1996) . RELIGION Religious intermarriage has primarily been studied in religiously heterogeneous societies. Some authors use current religious affiliation to measure intermarriage, while others use the religion in which spouses were raised. Endogamy is higher when current affiliation is used, because spouses often switch faith or lose their religion after entering a mixed marriage (Glenn 1982) . Estimates for the United States that use parental religion show that in the late 1970s, 62% of Catholics were married within their group, 84% of Protestants were married endogamously, and 80% of Jews were married endoga-mously (Glenn 1982) . Loglinear analyses further show that both Cath Protestants have a tendency to marry within rather than outside the this is found in the United States (Kalmijn 199 lb), the Netherlands (H et al 1991), Germany , Australia (Hayes 19 Switzerland (Schoen & Thomas 1990) . Comparisons between countries odds ratios show that endogamy is strongest in Ireland and Northern I one would expect, and that Catholic endogamy is stronger in the Unit than in most European countries (Klein & Wunder 1996 SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS The literature on socioeconomic homogamy can be distinguished into studies of ascribed status and studies of achieved status. Ascribed status positions are measured by the occupational class of the father and the father-in-law. Achieved status positions are measured by education and occupation. Education is used more often because it is a convenient status indicator of women and changes little after marriage. In most countries, educational homogamy is quite strong (about 0.55), occupational homogamy is somewhat weaker (about 0.40), while the correlation between husbands' and wives' class origins is the weakest, about 0.30 (Kalmijn 1991 a; Uunk 1996) .
Loglinear analyses provide additional insights in the association bet partners' status positions. Such analyses first show that people marry rather than outside socioeconomic groups, although some groups are closed than others. Groups at the top and the bottom of the educationa chy are more closed than groups in the middle Hen 1994) . These tendencies may be due to the role of opportunity: If peopl bottom prefer to marry out, they can only choose higher groups and i at the top prefer to marry out, they can only choose lower groups. from farm background have an exceptionally high rate of endogamy, ing that can probably be explained in terms of the social and geograph tion of the rural population (Kalmijn 199 la; Jones & 1988) .
Next to a tendency to marry within the group, there is a tendency for marriage to become less common the farther away the two status positions are. Some status boundaries are harder to cross than others, however. For education, the strongest boundary is that between college graduates and lessereducated persons (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991 a) . A common interpretation of this finding is that colleges function as local marriage markets that are physically separated from settings in which lesser-educated persons are involved. Patterns of occupational homogamy, like patterns of intergenerational occupational mobility, are dominated by the line that divides blue-collar and whitecollar occupations (Hout 1982; Hayes 1993 ). More detailed analyses of occupational homogamy have shown that there is more homogamy with respect to the cultural status of occupations than with respect to the economic status of occupations (Kalmijn 1994 ). This suggests that preferences for cultural similarity are stronger than preferences for economically attractive spouses. RACE/ETHNICITY Analyses of marriage records generally reveal an in intermarriage of new ethnic groups in the last decades; this appli panic intermarriage in New York City (Gilbertson et al 1996) , to Asi marriage in Hawaii (Schoen & Thomas 1989) , and to Asian intermar males-not females-in New York City (Sung 1990) . The trend i white intermarriage has been documented for a longer time period an states. Annual marriage records in 33 states reveal that black-white riage has increased significantly in both northern and southern state legal ban on intermarriage was lifted, although it remains exceptio (Kalmijn 1993b) . Comparisons of the 1980 and 1990 American censu firm this conclusion (Qian 1997) . Ethnic characteristics that are not i marriage licenses have primarily been analyzed through synthe analyses. Such studies reveal growing outmarriage across birth coh European-American groups (Alba & Golden 1986; Lieberson & Water for American Indians (Eschbach 1995) , and for ethnic groups in (Jones & Luijkx 1996) .
Trends in Intermarriage and
The decline in ethnic endogamy has typically been interpreted fro similation perspective: Through generational replacement, natio groups gradually integrate in the host society. Consistent with this p most analyses find that the children of immigrants marry out more the immigrants themselves (Gilbertson et al 1996; Lee & Yaman Alba 1976) . Because trends also occur within generations of immigran vidual assimilation to the host society is not a sufficient explanation son et al 1996 ; Sung 1990 ). An additional interpretation is that assim process at the macro level: When more and more members of an eth are of the second or third generation-when an ethnic group "older"-all generations find it easier to adapt to the host society. An terpretation is more general in nature and points to the weakening in third parties in marriage choice and the declining importance of ascr basis of evaluating other people. RELIGION In the United States, trends in religious homogamy have p been assessed through surveys, largely because few places report re their marriage licenses and because the census is not allowed to ask on religious affiliation. By analyzing national surveys conducted 1955 and 1989 and using a design that separates the effects of period tion of marriage, Kalmijn (199 lb) shows that intermarriage between and Protestants has increased in a linear fashion between 1920 and 1980.
Trends in intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews have been documented b comparing subsequent surveys (Lazerwitz 1995) and by comparing marriage cohorts within a single survey (Kosmin et al 1991) . Both types of analyses show that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage has increased considerably over the last decades. An exception to these trends are conservative Christian who appeared to have stable endogamy rates over time (McCutcheon 1 In many other Western societies, questions on religion are included i riage records so that long-term trends can be documented there more e loglinear trend analysis of annual Dutch marriage records since th shows that religious endogamy of Catholics and the conservativ Reformed Protestants has declined (Hendrickx et al 1991) . The more l Dutch Reformed Protestants experienced no decline, but they had low l endogamy to begin with. Marriage records in Switzerland (Schoen & T 1990) and Germany also reveal a decline in the endogamy of Catholics and Protestants. That the boundaries between r groups in Europe and the United States have weakened during the tw century is consistent with the notion of declining third-party contr matches long-term processes such as secularization and depillarization SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS Trends in socioeconomic homogamy are mo quently studied by analyzing class background and education. In most trialized countries, there has been a decline in the importance of social ground for marriage choice. This has been found for the United Stat mijn 1991 a), the Netherlands (Uunk 1996) , Hungary France (Forse & Chauvel 1995) . The most common interpretation of thi lies in the role of third parties and opportunity. Young adults have bec creasingly independent of parents so that parents have less direct or in control over the choices their children make. People also spend more school settings, which are more heterogeneous with respect to social background than the parental neighborhood.
Trends in educational homogamy do not point in one direction. A log analysis of 18 postwar industrial nations by Ultee & Luijkx (1990) revea five countries experienced a decline in educational homogamy, three co experienced an increase, while the remaining ten revealed no mea trend. Country-specific loglinear analyses also reveal a mixed patt though they do not reveal a decline in homogamy: (a) a strong increase United States (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991 a) , Hungary (Uunk et al 19 Germany (Blossfeld & Timm 1997) ; (b) a slight increase in the Nether (Hendrickx 1994) ; and (c) stability in Australia (Jones 1987) and (Forse & Chauvel 1995) .
Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain these trends authors argue that opportunities for making a match on education ha creased. People marry later and spend more time in school, but the tim val between leaving school and marriage has narrowed. As a result, it more likely that unmarried people, especially the college educated, mee spouse in school (Mare 1991) . Others point to the role of preferences.
tion has become an increasingly important proxy for both cultural taste cioeconomic success, and competition among men for socioecono sources in women may have increased (Kalmijn 1991 a; Schoen & Woo 1989) . There are also hypotheses predicting a decrease in educational amy. Some authors argue that marriage choice has become increasingl on emotional or affective considerations. Because romantic considerations often overrule status concerns, one would expect a decline in all forms of status homogamy (Ultee & Luijkx 1990 ).
An attempt to reconcile these hypotheses is made by Smits et al (1998) , who argue that educational homogamy will initially increase with levels of industrialization because in this phase, education becomes the dominant criterion for socioeconomic success and cultural norms and values. Romantic considerations and individualism gain importance in later stages of the industrialization process when high standards of living are guaranteed for everyone. As a result, educational homogamy will first increase with levels of industrialization, but will eventually decrease. A comparison of 64 countries provides indirect support for this claim: The relationship between educational homogamy and the level of industrialization follows an inverted "U."
Variations in Intermarriage and Homogamy
Next to describing patterns and trends, authors have analyzed variations in intermarriage and have examined what factors contribute to outmarriage. Recurring themes in the literature are differences by sex, by education, and by region. Although these factors are generally studied in an exploratory fashion, they also give us clues about the causes of endogamy.
SEX DIFFERENCES Sex differences have most often been studied in the literature on racial and ethnic intermarriage. Studies on black-white intermarriage in the United States consistently show that black men marry whites more often than black women (Kalmijn 1993b; Schoen & Wooldredge 1989) . A traditional interpretation of this finding is that minority men are able to compensate for their lower "ethnic prestige" by offering white women a high occupational status or income. Although in principle one could reverse the exchange-highstatus minority women could marry white men of lower status-under conditions of traditional sex-roles, this type of marriage is believed to be uncommon because the status of the family is largely dependent on the status of the husband.
Although the interpretation is plausible, findings for other ethnic groups provide a counterpoint. Asian-American women, for example, and in particular Japanese-American women, marry whites more often than their male counterparts (Sung 1990) . A speculative interpretation of this exception is that Asian-American women are attractive marriage candidates for white men be-cause of their physical appearance and presumed acceptance of mor tional power relationships in marriage. A more-plausible interpretat the role of opportunity: the presence of American soldiers in Japan A recent analysis shows that excluding such war brides leads to a s reduction in the sex differential in Asian-American intermarriage (J T Labov, unpublished manuscript).
Sex differences have also been studied in the analysis of socioecon mogamy. A common finding is that highly educated men and men i sional and technical occupations marry down more often than up (M Kalmijn 1994). Laymen generally interpret downmarrying as eviden luctance on the part of men to marry high-status women, but most of metry is due to differences in the composition of men's and women teristics. On average, women have traditionally been less educated an ten have had high-status occupations than men. Once such differe taken into account through loglinear analyses, researchers generally evidence of asymmetry (Mare 1991) . Similar conclusions apply
Educational downmarrying among men has become less common, b largely due to the increased educational attainment of women (Mar EDUCATIONAL EFFECTS Another frequently examined factor in inte is education. Many studies have found that more highly-educated m ethnic or racial minority groups marry exogamously more often t lesser-educated peers. This applies to white ethnic groups (Lieberso ters 1988), blacks (Kalmijn 1993b; Schoen & Wooldredge 1989) , and can Indians (Sandefur & McKinnell 1986) . Less consistent evidence i for outmarriage of Asian-Americans (Hwang et al 1995; Wong 1989 & Thomas 1989 .
Educational effects have been interpreted in terms of both opport preference. The former interpretation states that better educated members are more often exposed to settings such as colleges and h occupations where they form a relatively smaller group than in the at large. Another interpretation states that more highly educated both majority and minority groups-have a more individualistic att less attached to their family and community of origin, and have a mo salistic view on life than lesser-educated persons. As a result, they w ascribed characteristics less relevant in deciding whom to marry. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIONS AND SETTINGS Virtually all stud large regional differences in intermarriage. Asian-Americans marr often in California, where they are concentrated, than in the rest of t States (Wong 1989), Indian-Americans are more endogamous in so-c dian States (Sandefur & McKinnell 1986) , and blacks marry mor mously in states where the percentage of blacks in the population is larg lationship that is observed both in and outside the South (Kalmijn 1 Such patterns undoubtedly point to the role of opportunity: The sma group, the more difficult it is to marry within the group. Hypothes group size and its corollary, heterogeneity, have also been examined lyzing (Standard) Metropolitan Statistical Areas [(S)MSAs) or states t correlational analyses. These studies find that relative group size is n correlated with black outmarriage and ethnic outmarriage; similarly ethnic, and occupational heterogeneity have positive effects on the r types of intermarriage (Blau et al 1982; Hwang et al 1994) .
The role of opportunity has also been analyzed by considering loc riage markets. In a classic study, Ramsoy (1966) analyzed marriage lic a Norwegian city and found that husbands and wives lived close to ea before marriage, and in fact closer than one would expect under cond random mating in a city. While this confirms that neighborhoods are markets, Ramsoy also showed that people who lived close to one ano fore marriage did not marry more homogamously with respect to oc than people who lived far apart. Hence, it appeared that the neighbor not by itself promote occupational homogamy. Ramsoy's analysis wa cized on methodological grounds by Peach (1974) , but later, more ela analyses of newlyweds in a New Zealand city by Morgan (1981) f clear link between spatial and status proximity either. Analyses of et dogamy yield a more promising conclusion. Anderson & Saenz (1994) ample, find that MSAs in which Mexican-Americans are residentiail gated from non-Hispanic whites have lower degrees of Mexicar -Am outmarriage, even when other group characteristics such as mean edu level are controlled for.
The school is another local marriage market, but its role in promoting educational homogamy has only been studied indirectly. Mare (1991) found that people who marry closer to finishing school, or while in school, marry people who are more similar in education than people who marry long after finishing school. This relationship was found to be present only for higher levels of education. A similar relationship is found in Germany, although there, a decline in educational homogamy is only observed when comparing couples who married a few years after leaving school with couples who married much later (Blossfeld & Timm 1997) . These findings provide indirect evidence that schools function as marriage markets that favor educational homogamy. Schools, and in particular colleges, are educationally homogeneous, while the settings people face when they search for a partner at a later stage, such as work settings and public places, tend to be less homogeneous. Further evidence on the role of schools is provided by Uunk & Kalmijn (1996) , who show that the college-educated in the Netherlands have a tendency to marry someone who has the same college major. In the Netherlands, fields of study can be r as local marriage markets within the university because students choos jor when they first enroll and do not follow courses in other fields.
Multiple Dimensions
Most early studies analyzed a single sociological characteristic at a tim analyzed several characteristics one-by-one. Since partners choose eac on the basis of multiple characteristics, it is important to analyze more th factor in marriage choice. In the last decades, several such multidime analyses have been done, although most are limited to two dimension search on multiple dimensions has been guided by two hypotheses: th product hypothesis and the exchange hypothesis.
BY-PRODUCT HYPOTHESES There is a considerable overlap betwee groups in society. Ethnic groups, for example, differ in educational le ligion and ethnicity often coincide, and education and social backgrou correlated. Because the various social dimensions on which individuals one another are correlated, and because people are believed to take all t mensions into account when choosing a spouse, the question arises if what extent homogamy in one group dimension is the by-product of s in another group dimension.
An early attempt to examine this issue empirically was done by W (1966; see also Blau and Duncan 1967:354-59) , who showed that the cor tion between the spouses' fathers' occupations is reduced substantially controlling for spouses' education. This result led Warren to conclude t cial class homogamy is largely a by-product of educational homogamy recent analyses confirm this and show in addition that educational hom is in part a by-product of matching of social origins (Kalmijn 1991a; 1996) . Hence, both forms of homogamy appear to be weaker when a m mensional analysis is used, although even then, educational homogam mains stronger than homogamy of social origins.
The by-product hypothesis has also been a theme in the study of eth termarriage. A classic study of New Haven in the first half of this cen Kennedy (1944) showed that intermarriage is more common between who have the same faith, such as between Italians and Poles on the on (both largely Catholic) and between Hungarians and Russians on the o (both largely Jewish). Kennedy used the now classic term "triple melti to describe this pattern. Kennedy's triple melting pot confirms the byhypothesis because it reveals that marriage boundaries between certain groups are in part the result of differences with respect to religion. R more sophisticated loglinear analyses confirm that there are strong ma boundaries between ethnic groups who have a dissimilar faith (Alba & 1986) , but no studies have simultaneously analyzed individual ethnic an ligious characteristics of husbands and wives.
EXCHANGE HYPOTHESES A second theme in multidimensional analyses i question of whether people trade characteristics when choosing a spouse eral examples of exchange have been considered, but the most debated was introduced by Davis (1941) and Merton (1941) , who argued that me of ethnic groups whose prestige in society is low would have better cha marrying outside their group if they offered a high socioeconomic status i turn.
The Davis-Merton hypothesis is most frequently examined in research on ethnic and racial intermarriage. Loglinear and harmonic mean analyses of black-white intermarriage by Kalmijn (1993a) and Schoen & Wooldredge (1989) show that with respect to education, white women marry up more often when marrying a black man than when marrying a white man; similarly, black men marry down more often when marrying a white woman than when marrying a black woman. Similar conclusions apply when examining the marriage choices of white men and black women. White men marry down less often when marrying exogenously and black women marry up less often in mixed marriages. These asymmetries in spouses' educational characteristics are assessed after controlling for the marginal educational distributions of race-sex groups and thereby support the hypothesis that majority men and women marry a minority spouse in part under the condition of socioeconomic status gains.
While the pattern of black-white marriage provides support for the DavisMerton hypothesis, studies of other types of ethnic homogamy are less consistent. In a harmonic mean analysis of Asian intermarriage in Hawaii, Schoen & Thomas (1989) show that after controlling for differences in educational distributions, white women marry up more often when they marry Filipino and Japanese males, consistent with the notion of exchange. The reverse is true, however, when white women marry Hawaiian or Chinese males.
The exchange hypothesis has also been applied to other dimensions of partner choice, such as physical attractiveness and cultural participation. To examine exchanges, studies generally rely on correlational analyses in which socioeconomic characteristics of the husband are regressed on socioeconomic and noneconomic characteristics of the wife. Effects of the wife's noneconomic characteristics on the husband's socioeconomic characteristics are usually called crossing effects and are considered evidence for exchange.
In an early analysis of physical attractiveness of women and occupational prestige of men, Taylor & Glenn (1976) show that female attractiveness has a positive effect on the occupational prestige of the man she marries, even when controlling for her own socioeconomic characteristics. A drawback of this analysis is that husband's attractiveness was not included in the mod cupational prestige and attractiveness are correlated within individu people match in attractiveness, part of the effect of female attract male prestige may be spurious. A more recent analysis, which also co the physical attractiveness of the husband, confirms this. Stevens e find no effect of female attractiveness on husbands' education, sugg no exchanges are being made.
Another example of exchange is that between socioeconomic stat participation in high culture. DiMaggio & Mohr (1985) find that pa of the wife in high culture has a positive effect on the educational l husband, net of the educational level of the wife. Because no measur husband's cultural participation were included in this model, the ex fect might again be due to homogamy with respect to cultural partic analysis for the Netherlands, however, shows that this is not the (1996) analyzes the correlation between the wife's cultural particip the husband's educational level while controlling not only for the w cational level but also for the husband's cultural participation. Uun significant partial association between female high culture and ma tion, providing support for the exchange hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
Sociological research on marriage choices has generated many insig modem society is differentiated. In general, social groups in socie closed, in the sense that men and women more often choose part their group than one would expect under random mating. Althou groups are more closed than others, examples of social groups who ogamously have not (yet) been found. Research on intermarriage how societies change. Overall, ascribed bases of group membershi come less important, while achieved bases of group membership, cially those governed by education, have not lost salience. This is that ascribed groups are mixing freely now. Ethnic, religious, and p racial boundaries still exist, but they are weaker than they used to
The focus of the literature has largely been descriptive. Resear scrutinized a mass of data-coming from censuses, surveys, and m censes-and have studied many groups, several countries, and long time. Because marriage patterns are telling indicators of how closed a society are, the descriptive focus of the literature has much to Monitoring such a social indicator also requires a certain degree of zation, and in this respect, the literature has its shortcomings. Som limited to percentages, which are heavily affected by relative group ing it difficult to compare endogamy across groups. Other studies u models, and while these are an advance from a methodological po they have probably made the literature less accessible to a gener than it deserves to be. In carrying on its descriptive mission, th would gain by using simple odds ratios next to percentages or logl when describing the degree of endogamy of groups. A good exa an approach is provided in Lieberson & Waters (1988) . In describin would also be useful to focus on recently formed marriages rathe stock of marriages at a given point in time, largely because the aim social indicators for a clearly defined period in time.
In a theoretical sense, there has also been progress in the fiel many theories about partner choice, and such notions provide im about the causes of intermarriage and homogamy. In general, m terns arise from three social forces: the preferences of individuals f in a partner, the influence of the social group, and the constraint riage market. The multifaceted perspective that has been develo years gives sociological theorizing an edge over competing theor riage choice such as those developed by psychologists and econom Considerable empirical evidence exists for these theoretical noti integration of empirical and theoretical work is less than perfect. Th basic problems in empirical work. First, many hypotheses are test rect fashion. The role of third-party control, for example, is doc comparing ethnic groups or religious denominations, but little in available on what these parties in fact are doing. Similarly, the tr increasing educational homogamy may point to heightened com economic resources on the marriage market, but this is an interpr test. A second and related problem in empirical work is that man served regularities and relationships can be attributed to all thr causes, while little is yet known about the relative strengths of That more highly educated members of minority groups are less for example, may be attributed to a universalistic attitude broug higher education, but can also be explained in terms of greater op meet outgroup members. In a similar fashion, residential segregat ter endogamy by lowering opportunities, but its effect may also by different socialization practices in segregated areas.
While it is clear that progress can be made in integrating theoreti pirical work, this is not a straightforward task either. One possib to shift the focus from the aggregate to the individual level. In t studies have compared countries, groups, or time periods, but few analyzed individual differences in intermarriage. The main advant dividual approach is that it facilitates the inclusion of a range of each of the three elements of the theory. While an individual design would facilitate the multivariate analyses that are needed to test hypotheses more directly and to compare the strength of alternative explanations, such a design has its problems as well. Because multivariate analyses of marriage choices use individuals as the unit of analysis, they provide a one-sided view of marriage. It takes two to marry, and for that reason most authors have used loglinear or harmonic mean models. Such models correctly use marriages as the unit of analysis, rather than individuals, but make it difficult to include multiple covariates in the model. From a methodological point of view, such models are preferable, but if the prime concern is to test theories, their advantage is not so obvious.
